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Self-locating attitudes and assertions provide a challenge to the received view of mental
and linguistic intentionality. In this paper I try to show that the best way to meet
this challenge is to adopt relativistic, centred possible worlds accounts for both belief
and communication. First, I argue that self-locating beliefs support a centred account
of belief. Second, I argue that self-locating utterances support a complementary cen-
tred account of communication. Together, these two claims motivate a unified centred
conception of belief and communication.
1 Introduction
What are the objects of belief, what are the objects of assertion, and how do the two
interact in communication? Consider my belief that I have Torsonic Polarity Syndrome.
What is its content? Do I express the same content when I utter the sentence “I have
Torsonic Polarity Syndrome”? What do you, the hearer, learn from the assertion?
Here’s the standard picture: the things we believe are also the things we assert, so-
called ‘propositions’; propositions have absolute truth-values, i.e. they are equally true
or false for everyone, throughout eternity, and at all places (though they are allowed to
vary from possible world to possible world); in communication, the speaker transmits a
proposition she believes to the hearer by performing an utterance that expresses it.
The picture has three central elements: 1. Monism, 2. Absolutism, and 3. Transmis-
sion. Roughly, Monism is the claim that the objects of beliefs and utterances are the
same type of entity, propositions; Absolutism states that the truth-values of propositions
are constant within the same possible world; and Transmission has it that successful
communication consists in the transmission of a proposition from speaker to hearer. As
simple and neat as the standard view may be, it faces a serious obstacle: it has difficulties
accounting for self-locating thoughts and utterances. I argue that we should abandon
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Absolutism and adopt relativistic accounts of belief and communication instead. That
allows us to maintain Monism, at the price of Transmission.
According to the received view, propositions play a number of different theoretical
roles. In addition to their roles as contents of attitudes and assertions, they are taken
to be the semantic values of sentences, the referents of that-clauses, the nodes of logical
relations, and bearers of truth and modal properties (King, 2003, 2007, 2014; McGrath,
2012; Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009; Schaffer, 2012; Soames, 2012). Call the claim that
all of these roles have a unique realiser Monismprop. Here, we are primarily interested in
the narrower question of whether the contents of beliefs and assertions are of the same
type:
Monismatt-ass
There is one type of entity that is both the content of attitudes and the content
of assertions.1
To allow for the potential falsity of Monism, i.e. for the possibility that different
propositional roles have different realisers, we should also give more specific formulations
of Absolutism. The following two are relevant here:
Absolutismatt
The content of attitudes varies in truth-value at most from possible world to
possible world.
Absolutismass
The content of assertions varies in truth-value at most from possible world to
possible world.
Correspondingly, there are two relevant versions of Relativism:2
Relativismatt
The content of some attitudes varies in truth-value relative to non-worldly pa-
rameters, such as times, places, or individuals.
Relativismass
The content of some assertions varies in truth-value relative to non-worldly pa-
rameters, such as times, places, or individuals.
1 This claim is somewhat imprecise. On the intended interpretation sets of possible worlds (absolute
contents) and sets of centered possible worlds (relativistic contents) count as different types of entities.
2 This use of “Relativism” corresponds to that of Ko¨lbel (2008). Relativism thus understood is not
committed to the claim that propositional truth is relative to contexts of assessment (MacFarlane,
2014) and covers forms of nonindexical contextualism (MacFarlane, 2009).
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An attractive feature of combining Monism and Absolutism is the promise of a com-
pellingly simple and intuitive model of communication. In a nutshell, it looks like this:
the speaker believes a certain proposition which she wants to share with the hearer; she
can do so by performing an utterance that expresses it; the hearer, if she understands
the utterance and trusts the speaker, will come to believe that same proposition herself;
there is an identity in content between the speaker’s belief, the utterance, and the result-
ing belief of the hearer.3 We can capture this view of communication with the following
claim:
Transmission
Successful communication is the transmission of the content of one of the
speaker’s beliefs to the hearer via an utterance which expresses it.
In this paper I argue that Relativism offers the best account of self-location. My
starting point is the assumption that “belief content” and “utterance content” are the-
oretical terms which are implicitly defined by their role in our theories of belief and
communication, respectively. Relativistic contents, so the central claim, can play the
corresponding theoretical roles better than absolute contents. First, I present an ar-
gument for Relativismatt, based on the cognitive significance of self-locating beliefs.
Relativism about belief content provides initial support for Relativism about utterance
content, as there is a prima facie case for Monismatt-ass. But the support is fairly weak.
To bolster the case, I present an independent argument for Relativismass, based on the
content of self-locating utterances. We end up with a unified relativistic picture of be-
lief and assertion. While endorsing Relativism for both attitude and utterance content
enables us to uphold Monismatt-ass, it forces us to abandon the transmission model of
communication. But the Relativist has an alternative: the Recentring model.
2 Against Attitudinal Absolutism
2.1 Belief content and theoretical roles
Do belief contents have absolute or relative truth-values? It’s important to note that
this is not the question of whether beliefs, or belief states (i.e. the doxastic states of
individuals at times), have absolute or relative truth-values. A Relativist about belief
content can and should endorse an absolute notion of truth for belief states: Belief state
B is true iff the truth-value of B’s content is the True at the time/place/subject/world of
3 I’ve labelled this model of communication the “FedEx model” (Weber, 2013a); this name goes back
to “package delivery model” (Moss, 2012). Others have called it the “belief transfer model” (Egan,
2007; Torre, 2010), the “Lockean model” (Gauker, 2003), or the “classical view” (Pagin, 2008). The
above is a somewhat idealised sketch; e.g. in real life cases, the hearer doesn’t necessarily have to
endorse the utterance content. These finer points won’t matter here.
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B.4 Here, the truth predicate for belief states on the left hand side isn’t relativised to any
parameters; still, the definition allows that belief contents yield different truth-values for
different individuals, times, or places.
There are three major paradigms aiming to account for belief. In order to keep the
discussion manageable, I will focus mainly on these three candidates.
1. Standard Absolutismatt (Stalnaker, 1981, 1984).
2. Guises Absolutismatt (Perry, 1979; Salmon, 1990; Braun, 2002).
3. Centred Relativismatt (Lewis, 1979, 1986).
According to Standard Absolutismatt, beliefs are binary relations between subjects and
sets of possible worlds or corresponding structured entities.5 Guises Absolutistsatt think
that a comprehensive account of belief has to introduce a third relatum, so-called belief
states (Perry, 1979) or propositional guises (Braun, 2002). On both theories, belief con-
tents don’t change in truth-value within a world. Like Standard Absolutismatt, Centred
Relativismatt is binary. But it identifies belief contents with sets of centred possible
worlds, i.e. individual, time, world triples (Lewis, 1979). Such centred contents can vary
in truth-value between different subjects or times in the same world.
How should we adjudicate between these rival conceptions of belief content? Here’s
a good policy: in order to say what a belief content is, we may first ask what a belief
content does and then find something that does that.6 In general, if you want to know
what the nature of x is, first specify x’s theoretical role, and then look for the realiser of
this role. We can distinguish two central theoretical roles for belief content:
1. Belief contents explain and rationalise behaviour (together with the contents of
desires).
2. Belief contents capture the cognitive significance of beliefs.
The first role gives the rationale behind postulating content for beliefs in the first place.
Belief contents are theoretical entities that earn their keep by playing a crucial part
within a systematic account of human behaviour. This picture of belief underlies e.g.
the pragmatic theory of attitudes of Stalnaker (1984). It naturally meshes with a func-
tionalist account of belief, according to which beliefs are individuated by the typical
4 This clause mirrors the definition of utterance truth from Kaplan (1989, Section XIII).
5 Stalnaker’s recent account of self-location has important similarities with Perry’s framework (Stal-
naker, 1999b, 2008, 2011, 2015); it is unclear whether it still qualifies as a version of Standard
Absolutismatt.
6 This is a variation on a slogan by Lewis. The original quote goes: “In order to say what a meaning
is, we may first ask what a meaning does and then find something that does that.” (Lewis, 1970a, p.
20); for the underlying methodology see Lewis (1970b, 1972).
4
ways in which they come about, interact with other attitudes, and cause behaviour. The
second role is equally fundamental. There are different ways of classifying cognitive
states. For instance, we can classify them with regards to the complexity of their vehi-
cles. Classifying beliefs in terms of content is to group together beliefs that represent
things in the same way. Capturing cognitive significance is one of the defining tasks of
belief content thus understood. The functionalist approach provides a natural expla-
nation of how the two roles connect: cognitive differences correspond to differences in
associated functional roles, i.e. we expect that they can in principle be revealed in the
way beliefs are produced, interact with other attitudes, or cause behaviour.
There may be additional theoretical tasks for belief content which are also of some
interest, e.g. accounting for our everyday judgments about same-believing (see §4.1).
Ultimately, the best attitude may be to endorse a tolerant Pluralism about content:
there are different notions of content serving different explanatory purposes (Lewis,
1986; Perry, 2001; Chalmers, 2006). Still, the abovementioned roles seem particularly
central and the corresponding notion of content sufficiently widespread to deserve the
status assigned here. An initial concern may be that the proposed understanding of
“belief content” seems to exclude the Guises Absolutistatt from the start, since she uses
that term in a different way.7 Partially, this is a verbal matter. Everybody is free to
use the term “belief content” as they choose. As long as we keep the different notions
apart, no harm will result (to repeat, I here use it synonymous with “the realiser of
the theoretical roles of explaining behavior and capturing cognitive significance”). The
interesting, non-verbal question we’re trying to answer is what kind of entities do in fact
realise the mentioned theoretical roles. We’re not excluding Guises Absolutismatt, we’re
assessing it on the basis of the answer it gives to this question.
2.2 The argument from self-locating beliefs
The following argument against Absolutismatt focuses on the second role for belief con-
tent; in particular, it invokes the cognitive significance of self-locating beliefs.8 Indi-
7 I discuss this concern further in §2.3.
8 It is difficult to give a framework independent characterisation of the class of self-locating beliefs.
Typically, they are described as beliefs whose expression or ascription involves indexical expressions.
This is unsatisfying. Many beliefs are self-locating even though their ascription/expression doesn’t
mention any (overtly) indexical elements, e.g. the belief that the enemy is approaching. And belief
ascriptions that contain indexicals don’t necessarily ascribe self-locating beliefs, e.g. ‘Aren believes
that she is the chancellor of Germany’ might report an objective belief. A Centred Relativistatt
can delineate the relevant class as the beliefs whose content distinguishes between different centres
within a world. Note that, using the popular concept parlance, they are not restricted to beliefs
which employ a special ego or nunc concept.
A precursor of the following argument occurs in (Weber, 2015). It is inspired by an objection of
Stalnaker (1981, 2006) to Perry’s Guises Absolutismatt. In its present form, it also targets Standard
Absolutismatt.
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viduals with different self-locating beliefs differ in their cognitive perspectives. These
differences should be captured by an adequate account of belief. However, Absolutismatt
assigns identical contents to some such beliefs. Therefore, Absolutismatt should be given
up in favour of Relativismatt.
1. Self-Location: Different self-locating beliefs differ in cognitive significance.
2. Content Difference: Beliefs that differ in cognitive significance differ in
content.
3. Content Identity : Absolutismatt assigns the same content to some distinct
self-locating beliefs.
4. Conclusion: Absolutismatt is flawed.
Each premise seems plausible. Self-Location is intuitively compelling. Consider Aren
and Ani. Aren believes that he himself is in Perth and that Ani is in Berlin, while
Ani thinks that she herself is in Berlin and that Aren is in Perth. It seems plausible
that their different self-locating beliefs correspond to differences in their conceptions of
how things stand. According to the way Aren represents things, his own location is
Perth. In contrast, according to the way Ani take things to be, her present position
is in Berlin. Moreover, these representational differences are manifested in different
behavioural dispositions. If both wanted to be in Berlin, Aren would be disposed to buy a
plane ticket, while Ani would be disposed to stay put. Importantly, the main proponents
of Standard and Guises Absolutismatt endorse Self-Location as well. Stalnaker writes:
[. . . ] differences in perspective—in where the agents locate themselves in
the world as they take it to be—[. . . ] seem to be cognitive differences [. . . ]
(Stalnaker, 2006, p. 286), see also (Stalnaker, 1981, p. 148)
Likewise, Perry (1977, 1979) accepts this premise. As a Guises Absolutistatt, he will
locate some of the cognitive differences in differences in associated guises, rather than
content.
Content Difference is even harder to reject. It is simply part of the concept of belief
content as introduced that it aims to capture differences in cognitive significance. (It is of
course possible to question the initial background assumptions concerning the meaning
of theoretical terms and the centrality of the above theoretical roles. Here, I’m largely
taking these for granted.)
That leaves Content Identity. We can see that this premise holds by reflecting on
a variation of the two gods case from Lewis (1979). In Lewis’s story, there are two
gods who are objectively omniscient, but don’t know which mountain they live on.
While Lewis’s case is controversial, the proposed variation side-steps the central point
of contention. There is a persistent dispute over how to model the gods’ ignorance.
Standard Absolutistsatt might follow Stalnaker (1981, 2008) and represent it in terms
of haecceitistic differences between worlds. Proponents of Guises Relativismatt might
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explain it as ignorance of an objective proposition under a special self-locating guise.
In contrast, let’s consider the gods once they are omniscient simpliciter, i.e. when they
know which mountain they are on. The issue of how to model their ignorance doesn’t
concern us. The Absolutistatt seems bound to claim that when the gods have resolved
their indexical ignorance, they are related to the same content. As both gods can exclude
all other possible worlds, the content of their respective belief systems comprises merely
the singleton of their actual world {wgods}.9 Nonetheless, their cognitive perspectives
are rather different: one locates himself on the tallest, the other on the coldest mountain.
The Absolutistatt’s conception of content doesn’t reflect these cognitive differences, i.e.
Content Identity is true.
In order to use the argument as support for Relativismatt, we have to show that it can
do better. This is rather straightforward. According to Centred Relativismatt, contents
are sets of centred worlds. The omniscient gods are related to different sets of centred
worlds. The god on the tallest mountain believes the singleton of the centred world with
himself at the centre: {<godTM, tn, wgods>}; the god on the coldest mountain, on the
other hand, is related to a content centred on himself: {<godCM, tn, wgods>}. As desired,
the different self-locating beliefs are assigned different contents. Since centred content
is better suited to fulfil belief content’s central theoretical role, Centred Relativismatt is
preferable to Absolutismatt.10 Like most arguments in philosophy, this is not a knock-
down argument. We will now look at potential reactions from Absolutistsatt.
2.3 Replies
A Guises Absolutistatt like Perry might offer the following reply: ‘True, we cannot
capture cognitive significance purely in terms of what I call “content”. The entities
which do model cognitive significance in my framework, i.e. what you call “content”, are
pairs of the form <guise, proposition> (or just guises). Your argument doesn’t show that
there is something wrong with my theory, but merely that our use of “content” isn’t the
same.’ Fair enough—we shouldn’t fight over words. The crucial question is what does
9 We can put the point in terms of structured propositions as well: as both are omniscient simpliciter,
both are equally belief-related to all true propositions.
10 An opponent may raise the following discomforting question: ‘Doesn’t Centred Relativismatt face a
very similar objection? As an unstructured account of content, it identifies the contents of cognitively
distinct, but logically equivalent beliefs.’ Firstly, granting the point, we may take the argument to
support structured Relativismatt a` la Chalmers (2011). Secondly, my own view is that the problem of
logical omniscience and that of self-location aren’t analogous. Introducing centred content solves the
problem of self-location, whereas introducing structured content doesn’t ultimately offer a satisfying
solution to the problem of logical omniscience—it merely serves to scale it down. There seem to be
co-intensional and co-structural beliefs which nevertheless differ in cognitive significance. Moreover,
even the structuralist needs to account for the distinction between available, standing beliefs and
ones which are unavailable, merely implied by what is believed (Stalnaker, 1991). We all have to live
with the problem of logical omniscience (at least for the time being), but not with the problem of
self-location. Of course, these points require much more substantiation than I can offer here.
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the job in question. According to the above response, it is done by guise-proposition pairs
(or just guises). The cognitive differences between the gods are modeled by distinct pairs
of this form. Still, the conclusion of the argument stands: Absolutismatt is untenable.
Contents thus understood don’t have absolute truth values. According to Perry (1979),
the guise/proposition distinction for beliefs parallels that between character and content
(Kaplan, 1989). Characters are functions from contexts and circumstances of evaluations
to truth-values. Importantly, they (often) have variable truth values—characters (often)
assign different truth-values to different contexts in the same world. Belief contents,
understood as guise-propositions pairs (or simply guises) are therefore not absolute.
True, we can, using this conception of belief content, assign absolute truth-values to belief
states. But as mentioned before, the distinction between Relativismatt and Absolutismatt
concerns whether belief contents are absolute or relativistic. Accordingly, we can call
this account of belief “Guises Relativismatt”. Guises Relativismatt isn’t a departure
from Perry’s proposal; it merely acknowledges that the entities playing the role of belief
content are relativistic.
The Relativistatt now has two options: Centred and Guises Relativismatt. Which one
is preferable? There is reason to opt for Centred Relativismatt. First, it is simpler.11
Second, Centred Relativismatt better meshes with our best developed, formal theory
of belief: Bayesianism (Chalmers, 2011; Egan, MS). It is not out of the question that
we might devise a version of Bayesianism that assigns credences to guise-proposition
pairs. But there would be a serious downside (Chalmers, 2011): the Guises Relativistatt
has to forgo the theoretical benefits of the set-theoretic apparatus of which the Centred
Relativistatt can avail herself—just like sets of ordinary, possible worlds propositions,
sets of centred propositions form a sigma algebra over which to assign a probability
distribution. A better option for the Guises Relativistatt is to assign credences to the
diagonals of guises/characters.12 She could then quite generally identify the objects of
beliefs with diagonal contents. On a natural understanding, diagonal contents are sets
of centred possible worlds. Guises Relativismatt so conceived is equivalent to Centred
Relativismatt.
How might a Standard Absolutistatt respond? She could try to deny Self-location.
According to this suggestion, the omniscient gods’ belief systems have the same cognitive
significance. Prima facie, this response is implausible. As Stalnaker put it, perspectival
differences seem to be cognitive differences. However, the notion of cognitive signifiance
is itself somewhat technical, so there may be some room for maneuver here. There seems
to be a better option: rejecting Content Identity. I have argued elsewhere (Weber, 2015)
that Absolutistsatt who try to account for self-location are driven towards Indexical
11 The additional complexity of Guises Relativismatt might turn out to be advantageous in accounting
for other theoretical roles of belief content.
12 Characters are typically represented as two-dimensional matrices. The diagonal of such a matrix is
the set of cells for which context of utterance and circumstance of evaluation coincide.
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Russellianism. Indexical Russellianism has three central commitments.
1. Self-locating beliefs are relations between a subject and singular propo-
sitions about the subject (or the present time).
2. Self-locating beliefs are the only singular beliefs we have; all other beliefs
are purely qualitative.
3. For every subject S and every time t: S is certain that she is S and the
present time is t.
Instead of rejecting Self-location, the Russellian can deny Content Identity. On her
analysis, the gods are related to different singular contents. That is a reflection of the
general fact that no two subjects with self-locating beliefs are related to the same content
(e.g. only godCM himself can entertain singular propositions about godCM).13 Not even
a god can be omniscient in the sense of knowing every true proposition. Hence, the gods’
omniscience rightly understood doesn’t entail that they are related to the same content.
And this assumption was crucial in establishing Content Identity.
Like diagonal Guises Relativismatt, Indexical Russellianism is at bottom very similar
to Centred Relativismatt (Schwarz, 2014). In a sense, the thinker and the present mo-
ment play the role of the centre in the Russellian framework.14 On the Lewisian account,
to have the self-locating belief I am such-and-such is to rule out centred worlds where
the centre isn’t such-and-such. (Typically, S’s doxastic alternatives will include centred
worlds with individuals other than S at the centre.) According to the Russellian, for S
to have this belief is to rule out worlds where S isn’t such-and-such. Since S is certain
that she’s S, there is never a question about which individual counts as “the centre” in
a given belief world. When the Lewisian models S’s belief state with two centres within
a world, the Russellian employs two qualitatively identical worlds which differ in S’s
location (and vice versa). There is a one-to-one correspondence between the Russellian
and the centred representation of doxastic states. Some may think that, in spite of
this equivalence, Indexical Russellianism is superior, because it preserves Absolutismatt.
Whether this is a virtue depends on the case for Absolutismatt. I will argue in §4 that it
is pretty weak. Moreover, the main support for Absolutismatt—Transmission—doesn’t
support Indexical Russellianism, as it too is inconsistent with the transmission model
of communication. There seems to be no good reason to choose Indexical Russellian-
ism over Centred Relativismatt. On the other hand, it is unclear whether Indexical
Russellianism can handle all additional arguments against Absolutismatt mentioned in
the next section. Furthermore, the Centred Relativist already has an alternative to the
13 Indexical Russellianism is similar to the account of 1st personal thoughts ascribed to Frege (1918), in
that the content of 1st personal thoughts is private.
14 In the following, I will omit reference to times.
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Transmission model, while there is as yet no Russellian alternative.15 Others have crit-
icised the Russellian for her metaphysical commitments, in particular her endorsement
of haecceitism (Feit, 2008; Torre, 2010). Hence, there seem to be grounds for prefering
Centred Relativism over Indexical Russellianism.
2.4 Other arguments
There are further arguments from self-locating attitudes for Relativismatt.16 1. We
have already mentioned the story of the two gods from Lewis (1979); Chalmers (2011)
presents a very similar example. It is possible to be omniscient with respect to objec-
tive/absolute propositions, without being omniscient simpliciter ; hence, there are sub-
jective/relativistic contents that explain the residual ignorance. 2. In addition, Lewis
(1979) gives an argument from self-location and belief internalism: if A has the self-
locating belief I am A, then A’s duplicate and world-mate B also has this belief; the
content of A’s belief is true, while that of B is false; therefore, some contents vary in
truth-value within the same world. 3. Perry’s (1977, 1979) influential arguments focus on
content’s role of explaining and rationalising behavior. A and B may share all beliefs and
desires with objective/absolute contents, but still differ in their behavioral dispositions;
Absolutismatt has difficulties explaining these dispositional differences. 4. A straight-
forward way of locating the realiser of the content role is to consult our most elaborate
theory of belief, i.e. Bayesianism. Assigning credences to sets of centred possible worlds
seems to be the standard Bayesian approach to self-location (Elga, 2000; Ha´jek, 2011;
Chalmers, 2011; Egan, MS); similar points apply to formal theories of decision making
(Egan, MS).17 5. Absolutismatt has severe problems accounting for intra-world ignorance
(Weber, 2015). You suffer from intra-world ignorance, if some of your belief worlds con-
tain several individuals that match your self-conception. This is the case for most of us,
since we assign non-zero credence to certain duplication scenarios, such as symmetrical
universes, universes with eternal recurrence, Everettian quantum worlds, etc.
Even if we don’t accept every single one of these arguments, in combination they
point fairly clearly towards Relativismatt. Next, I want to take a closer look at Centred
Relativismatt.
15 In (Weber, 2015), I’ve sketched the general form a Russellian model of communication might take.
According to that proposal, the Russellian model of communication mirrors the centred account:
when A utters “I am F” she expresses a singular proposition about herself, i.e. that A is F ; the
hearer B, on the other hand, acquires a different singular proposition about herself: the person
talking to B is F.
16 The following isn’t intended as a comprehensive list.




Centred Relativismatt is often met with skepticism about its intelligibility. For instance,
King writes:
[. . . ] it is hard to make sense of the idea that the things I believe may change
truth-value across time and location. What would it be e.g. to believe that
the sun is shining, where what I believe is something that varies in truth-value
across times and locations in the actual world? (King, 2003, p. 196)
Similarly, Soames claims:
Unfortunately, we are given no explanation of how a property [i.e. a centred
content] like being one who is making a mess can truly or falsely represent
anything as being one way or another. (Soames, 2012)
The best way to counter the general charge of unintelligibility, it seems to me, is to spell
out the centred conception of belief more explicitly.18
Centred Relativismatt is a modal account of attitudes. It describes belief in terms of
a set of doxastic alternatives, i.e. the possibilities in which a belief is true. It is therefore
helpful to contrast it with the standard modal account. As we will see, the two are very
similar. On the standard account, S’s belief system represents that p iff p holds in all of
S’s doxastic alternatives. Formally, this can be represented in a pointed Kripke-model:
M = < W,RS , I, wS >. W is a set of possible worlds, RS is a binary accessibility relation
between worlds, I an interpretation function that assigns sets of worlds to formulas, and
wS is a designated point (the actual world of S). RS determines a set of worlds accessible
from wS, i.e. S’s doxastic alternatives. S’s doxastic state represents that p iff p is true
in all of S’s doxastic alternatives.
Beliefmodal
S’s belief system represents that p iff p is true at all possible worlds w’ such that
RwSw’.
The framework contains two important theoretical primitives: the accessibility relation
RS and the set of possible worlds W . In itself, it doesn’t presuppose a specific interpre-
tation of “possible world”. In principle, a possible world might be anything whatsoever.
It is standardly assumed that they are what philosophers typically mean by that term:
18 There may be a more specific worry behind King’s remarks. The concern may be that Relativism
about belief content entails Relativism about belief states. This would indeed be problematic: we
might then criticise yesterday’s belief that the sun is shining as inappropriate from today’s rainy
perspective (Evans, 1985). But we have already seen in §2.1 that there is no such entailment; a
Relativistatt can consistently accept an absolute notion of truth for belief states. Note also that
Absolutistsatt like King cannot claim that there is a general problem with truth relativity, since they
accept that there is variability across possible worlds.
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maximally specific ways the world might be. S’s doxastic alternatives are maximally spe-
cific ways the world might be that are compatible with what she believes. (Obviously,
this isn’t a reductive explanation of “doxastic alternative”.)
We can understand the modification introduced by Centred Relativismatt as changing
the interpretation of “possible world”. We no longer think of them as maximally specific
ways for the world to be, but as maximally specific ways for an object to be. A way
for an object to be is a property. A maximally specific way for an object to be is a
maximally specific property. A maximally specific way for an object to be at a time can
be identified with a centred possible world. On Lewis’s conception, centred worlds are
equivalent to possible individuals, i.e. world-bound time slices of objects.19 Lewis (1979)
has shown that the centred conception is a generalisation of the standard one: it covers
self-locating and objective beliefs alike.
Doxastic alternatives can now be identified with Lewisian possibilia. Accordingly,
RS represents an accessibility relation between possible individuals, and the point wS
corresponds to S’s present, actual time slice. Propositions are sets of possible individuals;
a proposition is true at an individual iff the individual is a member of the set. A
possible individual counts as one of S’s doxastic alternatives iff the way that individual
is is such that S believes she herself might be that way. We can in principle hold on
to our original characterisation of belief, Beliefmodal, and reinterpret the relevant terms
accordingly. ‘Representing that p’ now also receives a new reading. We can, quite
generally, understand representation in terms of locating actuality within a space of
possibilities. On the standard conception, to represent that p is to locate the actual world
amongst the p-worlds. On the centred conception, to represent that p is to locate the
actual individual (i.e. oneself) amongst the p-individuals. It is to self-locate in a region
of the space of possible individuals, or to “self-ascribe a property” (Lewis, 1979).20 For
instance, for S to represent that she has Torsonic Polarity Syndrome is for her to locate
amongst the individuals with Torsonic Polarity Syndrome. Following this terminology,
we can put things thus:
Beliefself
S self-ascribes a property p iff all possible individuals i’ such that RSi’ instantiate
p.
19 A promising strategy for the Centred Relativistatt is to follow Schwarz (2014, §2) and treat the notion
of a maximally specific property, or centred possible world, as fundamental, and define the notion of
possible world from it.
There may be reasons to opt for centred possible worlds over Lewisian individuals (Chalmers, 2011).
We may need to augment centred worlds by an experience co-ordinate to deal with “two-tubes cases”
(Austin, 1990).
20 On Lewis’ conception, properties are sets of possible individuals, and property instantiation is set-
membership.
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What facts ground this talk of “representing that p” or “self-ascription of properties”?
Centred Relativismatt as such is not committed to a specific metaphysics of belief; it
can be agnostic about the ontological nature of doxastic states. Above, I have expressed
sympathies for functionalist accounts, according to which beliefs are internal states of
individuals that play the right functional roles.
Centred Relativismatt is often accused of treating the notion of self-ascription of prop-
erties as primitive (Holton, MS; Soames, MS). That criticism seems misplaced. Firstly,
the standard and the centred account seem on a par—they simply explain the same the-
oretical primitives in different ways. Further, as we just saw, the Centred Relativistatt
may think of doxastic facts metaphysically as physico–functional facts; and as an ana-
lytical functionalist, Lewis treats doxastic truths not even as conceptually basic.
Another popular objection charges Centred Relativismatt of delivering flawed inter-
pretations for a certain class of English sentences, in particular attitude reports or what
might intuitively be classified as ‘self-ascriptions of properties’ (Holton, MS; Soames,
2014). But it is a mistake to interpret Centred Relativismatt as proposing a semantic
analysis for certain English expressions. As Lewis has pointed out: “the connection of
belief sentences with belief as characterised by doxastic alternatives is complicated and
multifarious” (Lewis, 1986, p. 34). It is one thing to give a theory of attitudes, another
to give a semantics for English attitude ascriptions (see also §4.1).
Even though the centred framework and its terminology is non-standard, the underly-
ing view of representation is a natural one. We do not represent things from an objective,
god’s eye view. We occupy a specific position within space and time and judge things as
being a certain way from this perspective. Centred Relativismatt builds this perspecti-
valness into the very foundation of representation. It is not merely the representational
vehicles which are bound to a context, rather, what we represent is itself perspectival.
Centred Relativismatt seems more common-sensical and closer to the phenomena than
Absolutismatt.
4 The Case for Attitudinal Absolutism
So far, we have encountered arguments for Relativismatt, and attempts to defuse objec-
tions against it. What about Absolutismatt? What are the considerations in its favour?
The main points seem to be the following: i.) problems with Relativismatt; ii.) belief
reports; iii.) Monism; and iv.) Transmission. To a large part, Absolutismatt seems
motivated negatively, by the thought that Relativismatt is inherently unstable. Hope-
fully, I have convinced you that there is nothing wrong with Relativismatt per se. I will
therefore concentrate on the other points.
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4.1 Belief reports
Belief reports are commonly taken to provide an important source of evidence for
Absolutismatt. Our use of phrases like “believe the same thing”, “has the same belief
as”, etc. supposedly plays a very important role in deciding between different accounts
of belief content (or propositions). The idea seems to be this: when it’s true to say
“Aren and Juri believe the same thing”, there is something that Aren and Juri are both
related to, i.e. a belief content; their negations tell us when different contents are in-
volved; together, they provide identity conditions for contents. For instance, consider
the following reductio against Relativismatt (Richard, 1981). A week ago, Aren believed
that is was raining. Today, Juri believes that it is raining. According to Relativismatt, it
should be true to say: “Aren and Juri believe the same thing.” However, this sentence,
and thus Relativismatt, is false.
In fact, the significance of our everyday judgments about “same-believing” is very
limited. First, it is doubtful whether they decisively support Absolutismatt; there are
parallel cases where the corresponding report seems in fact correct (Aronszajn, 1996):
A week ago, Aren believed that Elvis was alive. Today, Juri believes that Elvis is alive.
Hence, Aren and Juri believe the same thing.21 More importantly, in order to discern
the nature of belief contents we should look elsewhere. Consider the following analogy:
It would be bad methodology to determine the nature of semantic values by focussing
on the folk’s usage of “means the same as”. There is little reason to expect that the
resulting conception of semantic values would be of much explanatory value, e.g. that
semantic values thus construed would be compositional. Instead, we should determine
the nature of semantic values by consulting our most successful semantic theory. The
same goes for our conception of belief content. Rather than focussing on the folk’s use of
“believes the same as”, we should consult our best systematic theory of belief. We can
agree that the folk are onto something—ordinary belief reports may track some relation.
What is questionable, in the first instance, is that this is the same relation as the one
specified by a systematic theory of attitudes. In the likely case that the two differ, we
can distinguish two relations: belieffolk and belieftheory. Arguably, belieftheory is of greater
theoretical interest.22
There is a closely related objection to Centered Relativismatt: the “account identifies
contents that ought to be distinguished” on the one hand and “distinguishes contents
that ought to be identified” on the other (Stalnaker, 2008, p. 50), see also (Soames,
MS). On its own, the objection doesn’t have much force. It may be understood as an
21 For related observations about same-saying see (Lewis, 1980); for an attempt to defend Absolutism
against these counterexamples see Salmon (2003).
22 Does this contradict the truism that belief is the relation which is denoted by our ordinary “believes
that” predicate? Yes, but the claim isn’t a truism; I’m not alone in thinking this, a number of authors
have noted a potential gap between the content of attitude reports and the content of the underlying
attitudes (Lewis, 1986; Salmon, 1990; Bach, 1997; Chalmers, 2011).
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appeal to our ordinary judgments about “same-believing”. In that case, it is vulnerable
to the response above. Alternatively, it may be taken as the claim that the Relativistatt’s
conception of content is explanatorily deficient. Then it has to be supported by additional
considerations. Which conception of content is theoretically superior is precisely what
is under discussion.23
4.2 Monism
Does Monism—the claim that there is a unique realiser of the theoretical roles of
propositions—provide evidence for Absolutismatt? Perhaps, Relativism and Monism
don’t mesh. For instance, King (2003, 2007) appeals to Monism in his influential argu-
ment against semantic Relativism. This is too quick. Relativism as such is compatible
with Monism—it may turn out that all propositional roles are realised by relativis-
tic contents. Only when underscored by independent arguments for Absolutism about
specific roles can Monism provide evidence against Relativism about other roles. For
instance, King takes attitudinal Absolutism for granted and then uses Monism to argue
against semantic Relativism. Can we reverse things and find support for Absolutismatt
from Monism and Absolutism about other roles? It doesn’t seem so. In (Weber, 2012), I
show that semantic Absolutism is untenable. In the next section, we’ll meet an argument
against assertoric Absolutism. And I have already mentioned in the previous section that
the referents of that-clauses don’t seem to conform to Absolutism in a straightforward
way either. Rather than helping the Absolutistatt’s cause, Monism seems to favour the
Relativistatt.
How bad would it be to abandon Monism? Why think that the propositional roles
have the same realiser? Usually, Monism is accepted without much argument.24 The
main support for Monism seems to lie in considerations of simplicity and elegance. It
is undeniable that there are close connections between the different roles. For instance,
there is clearly an intimate relationship between the semantic value of a sentence and the
content expressed by its assertion. Monism offers the simplest and most elegant account
of that connection: it simply identifies the different realisers. For instance, it may claim
that a sentence’s assertoric content simply is its semantic value.
However, appeal to explanatory virtues, such as simplicity and elegance, can easily be
overturned by more substantial considerations. Monism is not the only feasible account
of how the different roles mesh. An alternative is that different realisers, while not
being identical, stand in a determination relation. For instance, the semantic value
23 Stalnaker (2008) does provide additional reasons for thinking that Absolutismatt is superior (see §4.3).
24 Typically, the term “proposition” is introduced by pointing to the different propositional roles; for
instance McGrath (2012) writes: “The term ‘proposition’ [. . . ] is used to refer to some or all of the
following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other propositional attitudes
(i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences”.
I consider explicit arguments for Monism in (Weber, 2012, 2013b).
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of a sentence may determine its assertoric content (Lewis, 1980). Ultimately, to judge
the viability of Monism we will need to identify the realiser of each propositional role.
That doesn’t mean that we should consider these questions in isolation—the fact that
a potential realiser is able to also play other roles should count in its favour. But it
is arguably more important how well a proposed realiser plays a role relative to its
alternatives to begin with. Other things being equal, Monism is preferable to Pluralism,
but other things may not be equal.
There seem to be additional, more substantial arguments for specific versions of
Monism, connecting particular roles. For instance, one may think that belief reports
link the semantic values of sentences via the referents of that-clauses with the content of
beliefs. Firstly, we note that belief reports embed sentences. This suggests that senten-
tial semantic values are identical with the referents of that-clauses. Secondly, we assume
that belief reports report beliefs. This suggests that the referents of that-clauses (and
therefore the semantic values of sentences) are identical with the contents of beliefs.
While this reasoning looks seductive, both steps have been questioned: above, I have
questioned the second; for doubts about the first see (Cresswell, 1985, 2002).
What case can be made for the version of Monism under discussion here, which iden-
tifies attitude and assertoric content? Monismatt-ass seems to be part of a plausible story
about communication, whether absolutistically or relativistically implemented. For one
thing, it enables the Absolutist to accept the transmission account of communication.
And even though the Relativist cannot accept this view (see §4.3), Monismatt-ass still
plays an important role within her account of communication. It allows her to secure
the intuition that utterances straightforwardly express the speaker’s beliefs (see §6).
Given the case for Relativismatt, the attractiveness of Monismatt-ass lends some sup-
port to assertoric Relativism. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that there
is an account of communication on which the connection between attitudinal and as-
sertoric content is less straightforward, i.e. which relinquishes Monismatt-ass altogether.
Moreover, there are attempts (Egan, 2007; Moss, 2012) to combine Absolutismass and
Relativismatt by restricting the class of beliefs we can express to those with absolute
contents (the Relativistatt doesn’t hold that all beliefs have relativistic contents). In §5,
I will therefore give an additional argument for Relativismass.
4.3 Transmission
Absolutismatt may inherit some of Transmission’s appeal: only the Absolutistatt, or so
it seems, can validate this claim (Stalnaker, 1981, 2008; Torre, 2010; Weber, 2013a). For
Stalnaker, this is the main motivation for holding on to Absolutismatt:
The reason I thought, and continue to think, that it is important to repre-
sent the contents of indexical beliefs as impersonal propositions is that we
want our notion of content to help explain persistence and change of belief,
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agreement and disagreement between believers, and the communication of
belief. (Stalnaker, 1999a, p. 20; my emphasis)
And the transmission model of communication has received perhaps its most elegant
and powerful elaboration in Stalnaker’s hands (Stalnaker, 1978).
There are doubts about the tenability of Transmission, orthogonal to the issues under
discussion here (Weber, MS). It doesn’t seems plausible that communicative success
requires identity in content between speaker and hearer. Different subjects frequently
associate (slightly) different contents with an expression. The transmission account
seems to predict that failure of communication is equally frequent. It is less revisionary
to assume that successful communication merely requires a sufficient degree of similarity
or overlap of the content expressed by the speaker and the one acquired by the hearer.25
Let’s put this worry to the side and grant that compatibility with Transmission is a
plus. Why does the Relativistatt have to abandon Transmission? Simply put, assuming
that relativistic contents are straightforwardly transmitted in communication leads to
terrible predictions about what happens in successful communication. Imagine I utter “I
have Torsonic Polarity Syndrome”, thereby expressing my self-locating belief that I have
Torsonic Polarity Syndrome. If the relativistic content of that belief were transmitted to
you, you would come to learn that you yourself have Torsonic Polarity Syndrome (while
remaining agnostic about my state). Obviously, this is communicative breakdown, rather
than success.26
That the Relativistatt can’t avail herself of the transmission model of communication
is a cost, but it doesn’t seem particularly high. First of all, she has an alternative: the
Recentring model presented in §6. Furthermore, it seems that the Absolutistatt has to
ultimately pay the same price. Not every version of Absolutismatt is compatible with
Transmission. The one that seemed able to account for self-location, Indexical Russel-
lianism, cannot maintain it. Roughly, the problem for the Russellian is the following:
Consider once more my belief I have Torsonic Polarity Syndrome; according to Russel-
lianism, its content is the singular proposition that Clas has Torsonic Polarity Syndrome.
One would expect that my utterance of “I have Torsonic Polarity Syndrome” also ex-
presses this proposition. But it cannot be what my audience learns. It is the defining
mark of Indexical Russellian that only I can grasp it. It is hopeless trying to assign a
qualitative surrogate content to the utterance (see §5.2 and (Weber, 2015)). Like the
Relativistatt, the Russellian is bound to say that what the hearer learns isn’t what the
25 Things aren’t quite that straightforward; the mere fact that there is variation in content between
speaker and hearer doesn’t show that there isn’t also a shared content. I lay out the problems for
Transmission in more detail in (Weber, MS).
26 Again, things are actually more complicated. The problem doesn’t occur with every piece of relativistic
content. Also, there are attempts of bringing Relativismatt into harmony with Transmission (Egan,
2007; Moss, 2012). I doubt that these attempts are successful (see §5 and (Torre, 2010; Weber,
2013a)).
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speaker expressed, i.e. she has to abandon Transmission.
The problem isn’t restricted to Indexical Russellianism. Indexical Russellianism is a
response to a general difficulty for Absolutismatt. Absolutismatt tries to explain self-
locating beliefs in terms of impersonal and eternal contents. Prima facie, it seems that
we can be related to these contents in ordinary, 3rd personal ways, i.e. without having
the corresponding self-locating attitudes. The Absolutistatt cannot grant this possibility,
as it would make her account incomplete. She therefore has to assume that the relevant
contents are accessible only in a special 1st personal manner. But that forces her to
surrender Transmission, since the relevant content will be accessible in that way only
to either the speaker or the hearer, but not both. Any viable form of Absolutismatt, it
seems, will be in conflict with Transmission.
Summing up: we didn’t find strong arguments for Absolutismatt, counterbalancing
the case for Relativismatt. The best support seemed to come from Transmission. In the
end, that impression turned out to be illusory, since tenable versions of Absolutismatt
clash with Transmission as well.
5 Against Assertoric Absolutism
5.1 Semantic value, assertoric content, conveyed content
Do some assertions, just like certain beliefs, have relativistic contents, or is Relativism
about belief content best combined with Absolutism about assertoric content (Egan,
2007; Moss, 2012)? First, we have to get a clear about the distinction between a sen-
tence’s semantic value and its assertoric content (Lewis, 1980; Dummett, 1991). The two
perform different, though closely related, theoretical roles. Sentential semantic values
have two main jobs: i.) they determine truth conditions, ii.) they determine the seman-
tic values of larger expressions in which they are embedded. The first role provides the
rationale behind devising a semantic theory to begin with. We want a systematic account
of a certain type of behavior: the use of linguistic symbols. The central point of this
behaviour is the transmission of information. A highly plausible account of how strings
of linguistic symbols manage to transmit information is to assume that the users of the
language associate sentences with sets of situations in which the sentences are true/false,
i.e. truth conditions. The second role demands that semantic values are compositional.
To explain how we are able to communicate under time constraints using novel sentences,
we had better assume that the semantic values of complex sentences are compositionally
determined by the semantic values of their parts (Pagin and Westerst˚ahl, 2010).
That semantic values of sentences play a vital role in an account of the linguistic
exchange of information doesn’t imply that they are identical with the relevant informa-
tion. Their role merely demands that they determine this information. The information
which a systematic theory of linguistic communication assigns to a sentence is its as-
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sertoric content.27 Unlike semantic values, assertoric contents are freed to some extent
from the confines of compositionality. Further, in contrast to semantic values, assertoric
contents are required to be potential objects of attitudes, as their central role lies within
a systematic account of how individuals’ belief systems change in communication. They
share with semantic values the feature of being constrained by considerations of sim-
plicity, parsimony and systematicity. In that, assertoric content contrasts with conveyed
content. Unlike assertoric content, conveyed content is context-specific and variable. It
is typically richer than assertoric content, subject to various kinds of pragmatic infer-
ences, such as Gricean implicatures and pragmatic enrichments (Grice, 1989; Recanati,
2004). Contrary to conveyed contents, assertoric contents are associated in a stable and
conventional manner with sentences. Competent speakers will know the assertoric con-
tent of a sentence merely in virtue of their linguistic competence. On the other hand,
the notion of assertoric content abstracts away from information that is common to any
utterance whatsoever; it does, for instance, not include the information that sentences
exists, that an utterance has been made, etc. These features are not in general shared
by conveyed content.
5.2 The argument from self-locating utterances
Assertoric Absolutists claim that all utterances, even indexical ones, express impersonal
and eternal assertoric contents. For instance, uttered at t1, “It is raining now” expresses
the eternal content that It is raining at t1. Uttered by Aren, “I have Torsonic Polarity
Syndrome” expresses the impersonal content that Aren has Torsonic Polarity Syndrome.
On this picture, it should be possible to express the same eternal and impersonal content
with the right non-indexical sentence. However, it seems that indexical sentences and
their alleged non-indexical counterparts systematically differ in the information they
convey. Absolutismass has problems accounting for this difference, whereas Centred
Relativismass has a straightforward explaination. This is the central idea behind the
argument of this section.
The most natural proposal is that we can form the relevant pairs of utterances by
replacing indexical expressions with co-referential names; call these pairs of utterances
indexical pairs (IPs). Here are two examples:
(IP1) Today is March 28, 2014.
(IP1∗) March 28, 2014 is March 28, 2014.
(IP2) This is Aren.
(IP2∗) Aren is Aren.
The respective contexts are such that “Today” and “March 28, 2014” co-refer, as do
“This” and “Aren”. According to Absolutismass, the members of each pair have the
27 It is of course a prima facie option that semantic values and assertoric contents are identical.
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same assertoric content. However, that is very implausible. It seems obvious that they
express different contents: (IP1) and (IP2) are informative, (IP1*) and (IP2*) aren’t.
1. Assertoric Absolutism: According to Absolutismass, members of indexical
pairs have the same assertoric content.
2. Assertoric Content Difference: Members of indexical pairs don’t have the
same assertoric content.
3. Conclusion: Absolutismass is inadequate.
Above, we have sketched the motivation behind Assertoric Absolutism, but doubts may
remain. I will try to dissipate them. First, can’t Absolutistsass claim that indexical ut-
terances and their non-indexical counterparts differ in assertoric content, since indexicals
make singular reference, while names have a descriptive/qualitative content? Ultimately,
this doesn’t seem to be plausible option, since Descriptivism and Absolutism don’t form
a stable package. Descriptivism is only viable as Indexical Descriptivism, i.e. as the claim
that the associated descriptive contents are often self-locating (Putnam, 1975; Jackson,
1998). Descriptivism leads back to Relativism.
Reversely, Absolutistsass might think the equivalence fails since indexical utterances
express descriptive/qualitative contents, while their counterparts express singular con-
tents. This suggestion doesn’t seem to work either—indexical utterances don’t express
qualitative contents. Assume that I believe that we’re living in a symmetrical universe
and wonder whether I’m Righty (living on the “right” side of the universe) or Lefty
(living on the “left” side of the universe). You can remove the option that I’m Righty
from my doxastic possibilities by uttering “You’re Lefty”. No qualitative information
could have achieved this, since Righty and Lefty are perfect qualitative duplicates.28 It
seems that there is at least a strong prima facie case for Assertoric Absolutism.29
Next, consider the second premise, Assertoric Content Difference. In a nutshell, the
rationale behind this premise is the following: it is undeniable that members of indexical
pairs typically convey different pieces of information; the best explanation for this is that
they have different assertoric contents.
1. Information Difference: Members of indexical pairs differ in the informa-
tion they provide.
28 Ultimately, this point isn’t that crucial; we can run a parallel argument where indexical pairs are
formed by replacing indexical expressions with the corresponding qualitative descriptions.
29 A position I haven’t explicitly considered is the Neo-Fregean account of Evans (1981). Could a Neo-
Fregean like Evans reject Assertoric Absolutism? Perhaps, but Evans’s position doesn’t seem to be
a version of Absolutism. True, he holds that the truth conditional content of self-locating beliefs
and utterances is absolute. But it is not this content which plays the relevant theoretical roles. The
entities which do fulfill them are complex structures which essentially involve egocentric acquaintance
relations (or ways of thinking). It seems therefore more appropriate to classify Evans as a Relativist.
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2. Assertoric Content Explanation: This informational difference is best ex-
plained by a difference in assertoric content.
3. Assertoric Content Difference: Members of indexical pairs don’t have the
same assertoric content.
Information Difference seems uncontroversial. It’s simply a datum that members of
ordinary IPs differ strikingly with regards to the information they convey, the role they
play in rational cognition, and they actions they dispose us to undertake. What we learn
from an utterance of “Today is March 28, 2014.” is different and more interesting than
what we learn from “March 28, 2014 is March 28, 2014”.
The crucial premise is Assertoric Content Explanation. Is the fact that the utterances
have different informational values best explained by a difference in assertoric content?
While this seems very plausible, it is not entirely beyond doubt. In light of the distinction
between assertoric and conveyed content, Absolutistsass could insist that they can explain
all the data purely in terms of conveyed content. However, providing such an explanation
is no easy task. The informational differences between IPs are highly systematic. IPs
don’t just convey different information in special contexts or to some individuals. Rather,
the differences are more or less universal. In the above examples, a typical subject will
find one member interesting, the other boring. Even for someone who already believes
that today is March 28, 2014, there will be a difference between (IP1) and (IP1*):
(IP1) will (minimally) raise their credence that today is March 28, 2014, while (IP1*)
will leave it untouched. Similarly for other IPs. An utterance of “A comet will hit our
city in 5 minutes” will make me more confident that a comet will hit us very soon, than
an utterance of “A comet will hit Perth on March 28, 2014 at 3 45 PM”.30 The initial
problem for the Absolutistass is to give an explanation for this systematic difference,
which relies only on conveyed content. An additional difficulty is that the explanation’s
very systematicity gives us a reason to think that the relevant information is actually part
of assertoric content— it perfectly matches the characterisation of assertoric content’s
theoretical role.
While this suggests that any explanation of the data will, if successful, postulate a
difference in assertoric content, I don’t want to rule out that the Absolutistass might be
able to devise an alternative explanation. The most promising strategy, it seems to me,
is to follow Stalnaker (1979) and appeal to diagonal propositions. Indexical utterances
and their non-indexical counterparts express the same assertoric content—in the above
examples, both utterances have trivial assertoric contents. However, they may convey
different diagonal contents through a process of pragmatic re-interpretation, triggered
by uncertainty about the relevant contextual features.31 In effect, this proposal is very
30 The only exceptions seem to be subjects who assign credence 1 to the propositions that locate their
present context. However, such subjects are extremely rare, if they exist at all.
31 If having credence of less than 1 in the proposition that locates one’s context is sufficient to set off
pragmatic re-interpretation for indexical utterances, this process is basically always operative.
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similar to the centred account I advertise (see §6). Still, there are subtle, but important
differences. One difference is that I take diagonal contents to be relativistic contents,
i.e. sets of centred possible worlds. This allows us to identify the content of self-locating
utterances with the content of the self-locating beliefs they express. Stalnaker thinks of
diagonal utterance contents as singular propositions (sets of possible worlds) about the
utterance token. The content of the self-locating belief the speaker is giving voice to,
on the other hand, is plausibly not a meta-linguistic content about the utterance token,
since, we may assume, she had the belief before performing the utterance. The meta-
linguistic account of self-locating assertions is naturally combined with a meta-cognitive
account of self-locating beliefs, i.e. as beliefs about thought tokens. The ensuing picture
faces several difficulties.32 First, it detaches attitude content from utterance content and
thereby relinquishes Transmission. Self-locating utterances neither express nor convey
the speaker’s self-locating beliefs. Secondly, it seems psychologically unrealistic. It is
implausible that one can think about oneself only mediately by thinking about one’s
thought-tokens. Worse, token-reflexive contents fail to capture the cognitive significance
of self-locating beliefs and utterances. It seems possible to believe a token-reflexive
proposition in a 3rd personal way, e.g. by accessing it through a Chalmersian Cosmoscope,
while lacking the relevant self-locating information (Perry, 2001; Chalmers, 2011). If
the token-reflexive propositions really captured the cognitive significance of self-locating
beliefs and utterances, this should be impossible. Lastly, it is questionable whether
ordinary subjects are able to grasp singular propositions involving concrete objects,
including utterance/thought tokens (Lewis, 1981).
Absolutismass has difficulties accommodating the data; Centred Relativismass, on the
other hand, has a simple and straightforward explanation, as we will see in the next
section: informational differences between members of IPs are grounded directly in dif-
ferences in assertoric content. Absolutistsass might admit that Relativismass has greater
explanatory benefits, but insist that Relativismass is inferior, since it also seems to have
greater costs. A worry may be that Relativismass is accompanied by a flawed semantics
(often, the distinction between semantic values and assertoric contents isn’t drawn to
begin with). Relativismass, so the thought, is incompatible with semantic Absolutism
and a Kaplanian treatment of indexicals expressions as directly referential. This concern
is unfounded. Relativistsass are able to endorse the standard Kaplanian semantics for
indexicals, and they can in principle even accept semantic Absolutism. I have, how-
ever, already mentioned that semantic Absolutism is infeasible (Weber, 2012). Kaplan
himself is a semantic Relativist—he thinks that a compositional treatment of temporal
constructions, such as “It was the case that”, requires sentential semantic values to be
time relative, i.e. this is his famous “Operator Argument” (Kaplan, 1989, p. 503), see
also (Lewis, 1980). Many seem to think that King (2003, 2007) has managed to salvage
semantic Absolutism from Kaplan’s attack (McGrath, 2012). That’s a misperception—
32 These points seem to apply equally to the proposal of Perry (2001).
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semantic Absolutism fails even on King’s alternative extensional treatment of tense and
temporal expressions (Weber, 2012).
In contrast to Absolutismass, Centred Relativismass offers a natural and straightfor-
ward explanation of why members of indexical pairs convey different pieces of informa-
tion; further, the explanation doesn’t have untoward semantic commitments. Centred
content seems better suited than absolute content to play the theoretical role of asser-
toric content—Centred Relativismass is preferable to Absolutismass. Again, this is not a
knock-down argument. But a viable version of assertoric Absolutism has to tackle the
challenge of offering an account of the phenomena that is as attractive as the one offered
by Centred Relativismass.
6 Centred Communication
On the Absolutist’s conception of intentionality, beliefs and utterances represent what
the world is like. Trusting an utterance is to believe that the world is as the speaker
represents it to be. Since hearer and speaker inhabit the same world, the hearer can
straightforwardly treat the asserted information as a true characterisation of her own
situation. The relativistic picture of representation is different. Beliefs and assertions
represent what the thinker’s or speaker’s centred world is like.33 For an utterance to
be correct is for it to be a true characterisation of the speaker’s centred world. While
speaker and hearer live in the same world, they don’t share the same centred world.
An utterance that correctly describes the speaker’s situation isn’t necessarily also an
accurate representation of the hearer’s. To gain information about her own location,
the hearer has to make an inference from information about a different one. To do so,
she has to locate the utterance context in relation to her own position. In contrast to
the transmission model, where one piece of content travels from speaker to hearer, the
model involves two separate pieces: the content expressed by the speaker, the expressed
content, and the content acquired by the hearer, the acquired content. The following
is a rational reconstruction of how the hearer can derive the acquired content from the
expressed content:34
The Recentring Model
1. The hearer encounters an utterance “u”. [Perceiving]
2. The hearer believes that the content expressed by “u” is true of the
speaker’s centred world. [Centring]
33 I am assuming that the content of the utterance is identical to that of the speaker’s belief. It seems
feasible to identify utterance content with that of the hearer’s belief instead (Weber, 2013a, §6).
34 The model is described and motivated in more detail in (Weber, 2013a); a similar model has been
sketched by Heim (2004).
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3. The hearer believes that her actual centred world is R-related to the
speaker’s centred world. [Locating]
4. The hearer infers information about her own centred world from 2. &
3. [Recentring]
Some comments: First, the hearer comes across an utterance token. In typical cases,
she is spatio-temporally close to the speaker, but sometimes she isn’t. In the Centring
step, the hearer does two things: she associates a certain content with the utterance and,
in typical cases, treats it as a correct representation of the speaker’s context. In other
words, she understands and trusts the utterance. She then has to locate the speaker’s
centred world. She doesn’t have to do that in an objective way, it’s sufficient to do it
relative to her own position. And even if she knows next to nothing about the utterance
context, there is a relation she can always rely upon: cwh and cws stand in R just in
case cws is the centred world where the utterance was produced that the agent of cwh is
perceiving at the time of cwh. Put more simply: she can always locate the speaker’s
context as the situation in which the utterance she’s presently perceiving was produced.
Lastly, she infers information about her own centred world by putting together the
information from the Centring and the Locating step; i.e. she re-centres the acquired
content on herself.
Consider a simple example. Ani shouts to Aren: “There is a puddle over here”. First,
Aren centres the utterance content on the speaker’s context: he thinks that the asserted
content is the set of centred worlds with puddles near the centre, and he assumes that
the actual utterance context is one of them; he comes to believe there is a puddle near
the speaker. In a second step he locates the utterance context, the speaker is behind the
tree in front of me. Finally, he recentres the inferred content on himself: he comes to
believe there is a puddle behind the tree in front of me.
How does the hearer zero in on the right assertoric/expressed content? A sentence’s
assertoric content is the diagonal of its character (Kaplan, 1989). In line with assertoric
content’s theoretical role, it is associated with sentences in a stable, conventional manner;
it is context-invariable and can be grasped merely in virtue of linguistic competence.
Since she doesn’t have to identify assertoric content and semantic value, the Centred
Relativistass can be conservative about semantics and adopt the familiar Kaplanian
semantics for indexicals.
Centred Relativismass straightforwardly handles the argument from indexical pairs.
Even though members of IPs have the same semantic value in context (i.e. Kaplanian
content), they express different assertoric contents, in virtue of their different characters.
Consider (IP1) and (IP1∗). The assertoric content of “Today is March 28, 2014” is the
set of centred worlds whose centre lies within March 28, 2014. This is the sentence’s
diagonal and the content of the expressed belief today is March 28, 2014. Importantly,
it is an interesting centred content, including some centred worlds, excluding others. In
contrast, the assertoric content of “March 28, 2014 is March 28, 2014” is the set of all
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centred worlds; a trivial content. Given these different inputs at the Centring stage,
it isn’t hard to see how the hearer ends up with two different acquired contents, one
interesting, one trivial. This explanation generalises to other IPs, as their assertoric
contents differ analogously.
The centred model of communication straightforwardly explains why IPs systemat-
ically provide different pieces of information. And it nicely complements the centred
account of belief, preserving Monismatt-ass. We have arrived at a unified centred account
of thought and communication.
7 Conclusion
A comprehensive account of mental and linguistic intentionality that covers the wide
range of self-locating beliefs and utterances will be relativistic, or so I have argued. Our
respective thoughts and assertions represent the world from different perspectives—
everyone of us is at the centre of her own beliefs and utterances. This doesn’t mean that
their content is private and unsharable. But when we exchange our views of the world
with each other, we have to take into account our distinct locations within it. The added
complexity of the relativistic account might not have to be considered a downside—it is
simply a reflection of the cognitive situation we find ourselves in.35
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